



December 10, 2021

Submitted via eplanning.blm.gov

Bureau of Land Management
Wyoming State Office
5353 Yellowstone Dr.
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82009

Re: Environmental Assessment of the Proposed Oil and Natural Gas Lease Sale

Dear Sir/Madam:

Western Energy Alliance submits these comments on the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Wyoming State Office's environmental assessment (EA) of the proposed 2022 First Quarter competitive oil and natural gas lease sale. The Alliance urges BLM to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for this EA and proceed with the planned sale expeditiously.

Western Energy Alliance represents 200 companies engaged in all aspects of environmentally responsible exploration and production of oil and natural gas in Wyoming and across the West. The Alliance represents independents, the majority of which are small businesses with an average of fourteen employees.

The Mineral Leasing Act mandates that BLM shall hold oil and natural gas lease sales "for each State where eligible lands are available at least quarterly and more frequently if the Secretary of the Interior determines such sales are necessary."¹ Despite this mandate, BLM canceled all oil and natural gas lease sales that were or should have been scheduled for 2021, in violation of statutory obligations. BLM's announcement of proposed lease sales in the first quarter of 2022 is a welcome change, and BLM must proceed with finalizing its environmental analysis and scheduling the sale as soon as possible.

The Alliance provides these comments to strengthen and clarify the Draft EA to ensure that BLM presents the analyses in proper context and in a defensible manner that better informs agency decision-making and avoids creating confusion for the reviewing public.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Analysis

As a general matter, the Draft EA thoroughly describes the affected environment and analyzes direct, indirect and cumulative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in great detail. The methods used to estimate the direct, indirect and cumulative GHG emissions are

¹ 30 U.S.C. § 226(b).

reasonable and within the agency's discretion. The technical data that BLM relies upon and presents in the Draft EA is comprehensive and is more than sufficient to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for purposes of informing BLM decision-making at the leasing stage of the federal onshore oil and gas program.

BLM's decision to issue an EA rather than a more comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) was correct and consistent with NEPA and legal precedent. However, as we discuss below, BLM overstates the costs and underestimates the benefits of leasing the parcels evaluated in the EA. BLM should update its analysis and issue a FONSI to ensure that the Wyoming Q1 2022 lease sale can be conducted as planned.

BLM's analysis of the environmental impacts of leasing under Alternatives 2 and 3, the Proposed Action and Modified Proposed Action, makes clear there will be no significant environmental impacts from leasing under either option, so an environmental impact statement (EIS) is unnecessary. BLM conducted a thorough greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions analysis of both alternatives, and Tables 3.17 and 3.18 compare projected emissions from leasing either 455 parcels (Alternative 2) or 194 (Alternative 3) to total U.S. annual GHG emissions. On average, these options would represent 0.028% and 0.012% of total U.S. emissions, respectively – an entirely insignificant portion.

The data presented in the Draft EA demonstrates that GHG emissions from production are not significant, particularly in comparison to GHG emissions from end use combustion. This fact is evident when comparing the data presented within the EA and in Tables ES-1, 5-3 and 5-6 of the [2020 BLM Specialist Report on GHGs and Climate, which the Draft EA tiers to and relies upon](#).

The Draft EA should be revised to explain and clarify that indirect (combustion) emissions will occur regardless of whether oil and gas is produced from private, federal, or international and halting federal lease sales will not avoid these indirect emissions. There is no data to support a presumption that deferring these federal leases will result in a 100% decrease in downstream emissions. The EA should also explain that since the same amount of oil will be consumed regardless of where it is produced, emissions from oil and natural gas combustion will occur regardless of whether this federal lease sale occurs.

Moreover, the Draft EA should be revised to include the EPA's Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2019, published in 2021, to better provide accurate context for estimated direct emissions. This recent EPA report details:

- Total U.S. 2019 GHG emissions were 6,558 MMTCO₂e;
- Total direct emissions of all GHGs (CH₄, CO₂, and N₂O) from petroleum systems (E&P, transportation, and refining) and natural gas systems (E&P, processing, T&S, distribution) were 281.3 MMTCO₂e. See EPA Inventory Table

3-37 at p. 3-72 and Table 3-62 at p. 3-91; and

- Only 4.3% of U.S. GHG emissions come from petroleum and natural gas systems.

Therefore, on a national level, direct emissions from petroleum and natural gas systems are not significant. Further, direct emissions from federal oil and natural gas production are an even smaller subset of domestic oil and gas production, and less significant. The Draft EA should include this data and explanation to inform the public more fully regarding these projected impacts.

The Draft EA should also expressly explain that Congress did not grant to BLM the jurisdiction to regulate downstream end uses and combustion, and that NEPA does not require an agency to analyze the environmental impacts of actions that are outside the agency's jurisdiction. *Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).

The Draft EA should be revised to explain that BLM's calculations continually err on the side of over-inclusion and are likely significantly overstated, for several reasons. First, the EA assumes that each of the leases offered at sale will be purchased, fully developed, and produce substantial oil and natural gas. Historically, however, only approximately 47% of leased acreage proves to be productive, as not all leases are developed and not all development leads to producing wells.² BLM should thus update its analysis in Section 3.6.2 – Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change to reflect the historic 47% utilization rate to give a more accurate estimation of the potential GHG contributions to overall U.S. emissions.

Another reason BLM's calculations are overstated is the speculative nature of evaluating downstream emissions as part of a cumulative analysis. As BLM acknowledges in the EA, "the amount of oil or gas that may be produced if the offered parcels are developed is unknown" and "while the BLM has no authority to direct or regulate the end-use of the products, for this analysis, the BLM assumes all produced oil or gas will be combusted (such as for domestic heating or energy production)."

BLM's assumption that all leases will be developed and ultimately lead to downstream combustion and future GHG emissions is entirely speculative due to many factors including future commodity pricing, supply chain and labor challenges, regulatory procedures, actual volume of GHGs vented from processing facilities, and processing and pipeline buildout and technology advancements. Additionally, future innovations throughout the production stream could further reduce potential emissions from the sold leases. Therefore, the actual emissions resulting from this lease sale will almost assuredly be even smaller than the minimal amounts calculated in Tables 3.17 and 3.18.

² See [Supplemental Environmental Assessment for the May 2015–August 2016 Sold and Issued Leases](#), DOI-BLM-WY-0000-2019-0007-EA, at 17.

The Draft EA explains that “EIA studies regarding short-term ‘supply disruptions’ suggest that reducing domestic supply (in the near-term under the current supply / demand scenario) would lead to the import of more oil and natural gas from other countries, including countries with lower environmental and emission control standards than the United States.” This narrative supports two fundamental points: (1) lost production will be replaced by other sources, and (2) the replacement will have higher GHG emissions.

BLM should expand this existing narrative in the Draft EA to provide the public with more complete information about the national and global markets for oil and natural gas commodities, and market displacement and replacement, including the fact that both direct and indirect emissions will be replaced by other sources, even if BLM does not offer or issue leases from this sale.

The Draft EA should be revised to explain further that the market for oil and natural gas commodities is global. Production is diversified across the nation and world, with only a fraction of production in the state, national or global markets originating from federal lands or federal minerals. Approving or disapproving the sale of these federal leases would not affect downstream GHG emissions in any meaningful or significant manner because the global market will provide substitute supplies, such as from Russia or other OPEC countries that, unlike the United States, do not have robust regulatory programs and environmental protections to ensure they produce oil and natural gas in an environmentally responsible manner.

BLM should include an explanation of these national and global market factors in the EA and explain that the agency’s ability to influence consumption of oil and gas by increasing or decreasing supply is marginal at best.

Additionally, the amount of oil and natural gas produced from these leases will merely displace electricity generation sources that would otherwise occur elsewhere in the U.S. or in foreign countries, including coal production. Given the strict regulations that govern development on federal lands compared to other oil and natural gas fields, and the benefits of replacing coal with natural gas as an electrical source, development of these leases will potentially *reduce* future total GHG emissions.

BLM’s evaluation should therefore include the observed reductions in total U.S. GHG emissions and electric sector GHG emissions over the past decade. The continued leasing and development of federal natural gas resources provides significant beneficial impacts in the context of greenhouse gas emission reductions.

In terms of national context, the increased use of natural gas in the electric generating sector is a key driver of GHG emission reductions over the past fifteen plus years in the United States. When quantifying the indirect effects of the decision to lease federal natural gas reserves, BLM should calculate not only the emissions resulting from burning natural gas but also the GHG emissions reduced by generating more electricity with

natural gas. Because natural gas has 55% lower CO₂ emissions than coal, it delivers huge GHG reductions in the electricity sector, where emissions are nearly ten times higher. Significantly, natural gas has delivered 61% of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from fuel switching in the electricity sector, removing 2,360 million metric tons of CO₂e since 2005.

As EPA explained in its recent 2021 GHG Inventory Report: “Between 2018 and 2019, emissions from the electric power sector decreased 8.4 percent due to a decrease in electric power generation of 1.4 percent and a decrease in the carbon intensity of the electric power energy mix reflecting the continued shift in the share of electric power generation from coal to natural gas and renewable energy.” EPA GHG Inventory Report (2021) at 2-13.

EPA also explained:

For the time period of 1990 through about 2008, the carbon intensity of U.S. energy consumption was fairly constant, as the proportion of fossil fuels used by the individual sectors did not change significantly over that time. Starting in 2008 the carbon intensity has decreased, reflecting the shift from coal to natural gas in the electric power sector during that time period. Per capita energy consumption fluctuated little from 1990 to 2007, but then started decreasing after 2007 and, in 2019, was approximately 9.8 percent below levels in 1990.

EPA GHG Inventory Report (2021) at 3-36 (emphasis added).

BLM failed to account for these benefits in the EA, so we urge BLM to update its analysis and recognize the already minimal amount of emissions contributions overstates the potential impacts.

Finally, we note that the BLM Wyoming State Office’s analysis of GHG emissions in this EA, while likely overstated, is consistent with the template used by other state offices in their analyses of pending lease sales. When courts have found deficiencies with BLM lease sale EAs in recent years, one of the factors supporting the rulings has been the differing approaches to calculating emissions taken by various state offices. We appreciate that BLM is beginning to apply a consistent template across all states as it will ensure the final environmental analyses are upheld by the courts.

Taken together, and despite the conservative and likely overstated emissions estimates, it’s clear that Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 will have no significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions, so a FONSI is appropriate and should be issued with the edits suggested above.

Social Cost of Carbon and Greenhouse Gases

Another issue with the EA is in the application of the social cost of greenhouse gases (SCGHG) to individual lease sales. BLM is not under any legal requirement to utilize the SCGHG in environmental analyses, as we make clear below, and in fact it is not a tool that provides any meaningful information to either the public or the decision-maker at this scale. BLM should remove this analysis from the final EA and associated FONSI.

The use of SCGHG calculations presents significant risk to the integrity of NEPA analyses and does not advance NEPA's goals of promoting informed agency decision making because there are too many subjective variables that can be manipulated and advocated for to inflate the estimated costs for carbon emitting activities. These manipulations can include changing relevant timeframes, adjusting discount rates, minimizing the social benefits of domestic natural gas and oil, and arbitrarily calibrating other data inputs. Thus, the outcome of a SCGHG analysis will have less to do with the possible environmental impacts of a proposed action than with the assumptions BLM uses to perform the analysis.

As a result, rather than informing agency decision-making, the inclusion of SCGHG calculations may instead become a new strawman and focus for improper usage that goes far beyond the purposes of NEPA, such as justification to advance energy policy priorities or imposing compensatory requirements on lessees to implement such policies.

The SCGHG calculation was developed as a tool to measure the potential costs and benefits of agency rulemakings. It has been utilized solely in this manner by previous administrations, but it appears the Biden Administration now supports its application to individual environmental reviews to inform federal land management decisions, like this EA. Federal rulemakings potentially impact the climate and GHG emissions at a scale that allows for a comprehensive evaluation of the potential costs of that regulation. However, individual agency actions such as smaller EAs and permit approvals typically have at most a de minimis impact on climate change and GHG emissions, so applying the SCGHG does nothing to better inform agency decision-making through the NEPA process.

Courts have consistently upheld this approach to social cost of carbon calculations. The District Court of New Mexico recently held the following regarding BLM's environmental reviews:

NEPA does not require "that agencies weigh the economic costs and benefits of a proposed action. To the contrary, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 specifically provides that agencies need not do so, and in fact should avoid such comparisons when, as here, the NEPA analysis in question involves important qualitative considerations." While certain quantitative data needs analyzing, the "regulations preserve ample decision space for federal agencies to use the metrics and methodologies best suited to the issues at hand, consistent with the broad discretion typically afforded to an agency's choice of methodology"

BLM explained why it chose not to apply the SCC protocol. It further noted in one report that applying the SCC protocol is “**challenging because [the SCC protocol] is intended to model effects at a global scale on the welfare of future generations caused by additional carbon emission occurring in the present.**” (AR at 006618) (emphasis added). The methods that BLM used satisfy NEPA, and therefore, it did not err in avoiding the SCC protocol.³

Similarly, the District Court of the District of Columbia has held:

BLM here provided reasoned explanations for why it declined to use the social cost of carbon protocol. See, e.g. AR8920–23; AR12993–98. BLM explained that in the context of each lease sale, “calculating the [social cost of carbon] from CO2 emissions from the combustion of an unknown quantity of produced oil and gas would be highly speculative,” AR2827, and that the range provided by WildEarth’s comments and protests “represents a 4,000% difference in potential [social cost of carbon] estimates.” AR12520; see also AR1986 (estimating that “[u]sing 2015 social cost of carbon values, the costs to society of the federal fossil fuel leasing program is between \$18 and \$177 billion per year”). **BLM reasonably determined that a 4,000 percent range in potential costs would be “less than helpful in informing the public and the decisionmaker.”** AR12520; see also AR19285 (“While we agree that some level of uncertainty is unavoidable in assessing impacts from complex environmental systems, in this case that uncertainty is compounded by basing any potential [social cost of carbon] estimates on speculative GHG emissions.’”)

Accordingly, BLM did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in not utilizing the global carbon budget. “[B]ecause current climate science is uncertain (and does not allow for specific linkage between particular GHG emissions and particular climate impacts) . . . evaluating GHG emissions as a percentage of state-wide and nation-wide emissions . . . is a permissible and adequate approach.” *WildEarth Guardians v. BLM*, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (citing *WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell*, 738 F.3d at 309). (emphasis added)⁴

Taken together, these rulings make clear that applying the SCGHG calculation to project specific NEPA documents will provide no useful information for BLM in its decision. Instead, the courts make clear that this tool is potentially useful only on a broad scale such as an agency rulemaking that will potentially have a significant impact on global emissions, rather than a de minimis result at the lease sale level.

Tables 3.21 and 3.22 demonstrate clearly why the SCGHG tool is not appropriate in this EA. The actual cost per ton of emissions has fluctuated wildly over time, as different

³ *WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt*, Case 1:19-cv-00505-RB-SCY

⁴ *WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke*, Case 1:16-cv-01724-RC

administrations apply differing inputs and discount rates for the SCGHG tool. The Biden Administration has proposed, but not yet finalized, a regulation that would dramatically increase the cost per ton compared to the previous administration. In this EA, BLM examines emissions across various discount rates that provide cost estimates ranging from \$357 million to nearly \$5 billion for the Modified Proposed Action. While we dispute these numbers at a fundamental level and believe BLM's numbers are erroneous based on the aforementioned variables, the sheer range of the possible costs depending on the discount rate BLM decides to use shows how inaccurate the tool is at the leasing level. As noted in the ruling from the District Court of DC, this simply provides no useful information to BLM's decision-making.

Importantly, as noted above, failing to offer these parcels for lease will have no impact on domestic demand for oil and natural gas. Instead, production will likely be replaced by increased imports from a nation that doesn't have the robust regulatory protections enjoyed in the United States. As a result, instead of demand being met by domestic production, oil and natural gas would be shipped and transported thousands of miles to reach its ultimate destination, generating even more GHG emissions. By looking at emissions in a vacuum, BLM has failed to consider the relative costs and benefits of domestic versus foreign production.

Furthermore, the SCGHG tool as used here also completely fails to account for any social benefits that would follow from production on the leases. For example, development of affordable energy resources has vast and broadly applicable benefits for improving quality of life for the public beyond a simple calculation of the estimated benefits to public health and the environment. Oil and natural gas development and other activities should be considered not only for their potential costs with respect to carbon emissions, but also compared against their potential utility for improving people's lives, including the ability to drive climate resilience strategies.

If oil and natural gas development is curtailed in America, economic growth and public health would suffer immediately. In the absence of an alternative that does everything oil and natural gas do (home heating, transportation, industrial energy, electricity generation, electronic components, petrochemicals, etc.), restricting production is not a wise policy. Deciding not to issue a FONSI for this EA and not moving forward with this lease sale, or conducting a multi-year EIS, would restrict needed production from federal lands and represents that sort of policy.

Oil and natural gas not only keep people warm in the winter and cool in the summer, get them to school and work to better their lives, and power all facets of the economy, but put food on the table, medicines in the cabinet, and deliver clean drinking water to the tap. Providing more oil and natural gas to less developed countries will bring those benefits to the billion people without sufficient energy and help lift them out of poverty. Finally, domestic production has national security implications, as it contributes to a reliable supply chain and less reliance on foreign countries.

BLM's calculation of SCGHG ignores these important benefits, meaning it is fundamentally flawed and provides no useful information for BLM's analysis of one individual lease sale that will have de minimis impacts on global supply and demand and GHG emissions. Section 3.3.1 – Monetized Impacts from GHG Emissions should be removed from the EA and the FONSI. Doing so would not undermine the broader GHG analysis performed for this EA and still offer the public and BLM with additional information on possible emissions impacts, which, again, are insignificant.

Greater Sage-Grouse

The primary difference between Alternatives 2 and 3 are the number of parcels deferred because of their location in Greater Sage-Grouse (GrSG) habitat. As noted in the EA, following court decisions regarding BLM's implementation of the GrSG resource management plans (RMP), the Wyoming State Office "has developed a new strategy to prioritize leasing within sage-grouse habitats, which is incorporated in this analysis."

The Alliance intervened in the various lawsuits challenging BLM's GrSG RMP implementation, and these cases are currently proceeding on appeal. In response to the district court rulings, BLM is now implementing IM 2016-143, which details a prioritization sequence for leasing and development, in Alternative 3. It is important to note that BLM's GrSG RMPs already designate which lands will be open and closed to oil and gas leasing and development, and identify stipulations and mitigation measures implemented to protect GrSG.

The GrSG RMPs have already prioritized areas outside of habitat over those in general and priority habitat by virtue of the onerous restrictions applied; a further prioritization is not necessary. In fact, IM 2016-143 reiterates that leasing is still allowed in GrSG priority habitat with appropriate stipulations—an outcome consistent with BLM's multiple use mandate. As such, we disagree with BLM's decision to defer a large number of parcels merely because they are in priority habitat.

We understand that BLM may need to defer some parcels in priority habitat in order to satisfy those district court judges who have faulted BLM for previous prioritization practices. Our concern is the sheer amount of parcels that are being deferred in Alternative 3, which is not justified by BLM's reasoning in Table 3.27. Under the prioritization process outlined in the EA, BLM determined that 24 parcels should be deferred. However, BLM ignored this determination and instead is proposing to defer more than 250 parcels under Alternative 3 for reasons that remain unclear in the EA. It appears BLM has simply chosen to defer all parcels in priority habitat that were either flagged in Table 3.27 or are within 4 miles of a core area lek, as listed in Table 3.28. Alternative 3 would essentially establish a prioritization system under which all parcels in core areas will always be deferred. That would be entirely inconsistent with the RMP's holding that leasing should continue in priority habitat.

Table 3.27 justifies the deferral of 24 lease parcels consistent with the GrSG RMP and the state's Core Area Strategy lease prioritization process, but BLM is considering going far beyond this in Alternative 3. Deferring more than 250 parcels is simply unnecessary, so we urge BLM to move forward with Alternative 2 instead of Alternative 3.

Conclusion

Western Energy Alliance is pleased BLM plans to comply with its statutory mandate to hold quarterly lease sales in 2022 after a year in which it failed to do so. We urge BLM to issue a FONSI for the parcels evaluated in this EA after updating Section 3.3 – Greenhouse Gas Emissions and removing Section 3.3.1 – Monetized Impacts from GHG Emissions, per our comments above. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me with any questions.

Sincerely,



Tripp Parks
Vice President of Government Affairs